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Due to a rapid increase in network traffic, it is growing more imperative to have sys-
tems that detect attacks that are both known and unknown to networks. Anomaly-
based detection methods utilize deep learning techniques, including semi-supervised
learning, in order to effectively detect these attacks. Semi-supervision is advan-
tageous as it doesn’t fully depend on the labelling of network traffic data points,
which may be a daunting task especially considering the amount of traffic data
collected. Even though deep learning models such as the convolutional neural
network have been integrated into a number of proposed network intrusion detec-
tion systems in recent years, little work has been done on spatial-temporal feature
extraction for network intrusion anomaly detection using semi-supervised learn-
ing. This paper introduces Anomaly-CNVAE, a variational autoencoder where the
encoding and decoding layers perform convolution and transpose convolution, re-
spectively, in order to account for spatial feature extraction. In addition, in order
to account for time-based features in the dataset, the proposed model utilizes 1D-
CNN for the convolution operations. The performance of the model in network
intrusion detection is evaluated against an autoencoder and a vanilla variational
autoencoder. Results show that Anomaly-CNVAE significantly outperforms the
other semi-supervised learning models with a 5-10 percent increase in evaluation
metrics.
Keywords: Network Intrusion Detection, Semi-Supervised Learning, Anomaly
Detection
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1 Introduction
Cyber-attacks are becoming more prevalent in our society today. In particular, the
number of attacks pertaining to the entrance of unauthorized traffic into networks
is increasing. Even though some technologies such as firewalls are commonly placed
to stop these attacks from intruding into the network, recent advancements, which
have highlighted the pitfalls of these common technologies, have been presented to
improve the mitigation of this issue, including the development of network intru-
sion detection systems.
The primary function of a network intrusion detection system (NIDS) is to
detect malicious network traffic and raise an alert in the event of such an attack.
There are two types of identification: signature-based detection and anomaly de-
tection [1]. Using a database of predefined attacks, signature-based approaches
are able to effectively identify known network traffic attacks. Despite their low
false alarm rate, these approaches are futile against unknown attacks and zero-day
attacks. Furthermore, updating the database seems to be more of a cumbersome
task as attacks are growing more frequent and diverse. In contrast, anomaly de-
tection systems utilize normal traffic activity to identify traffic that deviate from
normal behavior. Even though they are able to identify both known and unknown
attacks, anomaly detection technologies are subject to high false alarm rates.
Regarding network intrusion detection, numerous machine learning ap-
proaches have been proposed over the past few years. A majority of these ap-
proaches fit under the category of supervised learning, where the models are trained
on data that include labels for all network traffic records. The convolutional neural
network (CNN), which is a deep learning model commonly utilized for classifica-
tion tasks in fields such as voice recognition and image processing [2], has been
included in several recent proposed models for multiclass classification of network
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traffic. Nevertheless, supervised learning models, including the CNN, are depen-
dent on the strenuous labelling of traffic data.
By contrast, semi-supervised learning requires that a certain portion of the
data is labelled. Some models that are designed to follow this learning process
include the autoencoder and variational autoencoder. In the case of anomaly de-
tection, both models take advantage of dimensionality reduction and input recon-
struction to first train on normal data in order to minimize reconstruction loss and
then identify data points within testing data that deviate from normal behavior.
When considering that benchmark datasets related to network intrusion detection
are imbalanced in favor of normal traffic behavior [3], semi-supervised anomaly
detection is advantageous. However, little work has been done to explore semi-
supervised anomaly detection on network traffic. Moreover, even as [4] proposed
a variational autoencoder model for anomaly detection, major improvements, in-
cluding those related to feature extraction, need to be made to the model.
In this work, I propose a novel semi-supervised learning model, Anomaly-
CNVAE, where convolution and transposed convolution are added to the varia-
tional autoencoder in order to extract and reconstruct spatial features in network
traffic data. Moreover, instead of the more common two-dimensional approach used
for images, the convolution and transpose convolution are both one-dimensional in
order to account for temporal features in the data. Anomaly-CNVAE outperforms
a few semi-supervised learning models on a number of benchmark datasets.
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives a thor-
ough overview of literature related to network intrusion detection systems. Chapter
3 presents background information necessary for the proposed methodology, which
is introduced in Chapter 4. After the datasets are introduced in Chapter 5, Chap-
ter 6 breaks down the experiment conducted on the methodology against other
semi-supervised models for anomaly-based network intrusion detection, where the




Anomaly-based network intrusion detection is the other primary means of keeping
track of normal and abnormal activity in a network. More research has been
conducted within this domain due to the ability of this type of system to identify
not only known intrusions, but also unknown and zero-day attacks. For these
new attacks, databases do not need to be updated [5]. Anomaly-based network
intrusion detection makes use of machine learning methods, where most work has
been done on supervised and unsupervised learning for network intrusion detection.
Supervised learning methods allow NIDS models to be trained on existing
network traffic data to identify unknown activity as normal or abnormal. This
opens up for the use of artificial neural networks (ANNs), which are function
approximators that model decision making inspired by the interconnections of
neurons in the human brain [6]. Researchers in this area have implemented certain
types of ANNs such as multi-layer perceptrons (MLPs), which are simple networks
that each consists of one input layer, one hidden layer, and one output layer,
support vector machines (SVM), which utilize nonlinear mapping to transform the
original training data into a new dimension in order to separate the data into
two classes with a hyperplane, and k-nearest neighbor (KNN), which takes the
proximity of data points into consideration in order to classify a certain data point.
One early example of use of these classifiers includes [7], whose MLP was trained
on the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency set to identify and predict
network attacks. Nevertheless, the MLP was still weak in classifying unknown
attacks as indicated in the significant difference between classification rates for
known and unknown attacks. Another example is [8], which proposed a recursive
SVM to build upon regular SVM classification in order to account for the extraction
of main features of data. [9] proposed an algorithm that combined the KNN and
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MARS algorithms in order to classify normal and abnormal behavior based on
collections of neighbors.
As stated before, a significant proportion of recent supervised learning
models tasked for NID incorporates the CNN architecture. One example model,
highlighted in [10], converts a normalized feature vector generated from a bench-
mark NID dataset to a two-dimensional format frequently used for images, which
required the removal of a feature using the coefficient of variance. The two-
dimensional input then goes through two convolutional layers and two pooling
layers before going through a fully-connected layer in order to classify the input as
normal or as an attack class. Additional works have expanded upon this model,
a number of which also integrated schemes to solve the problem of class imbal-
ance in NID datasets. For instance, [3] introduces AS-CNN, where the ADASYN
algorithm augments the data in order to account for an imbalanced data distribu-
tion and a split convolution component is incorporated to the CNN architecture
to reduce interchannel information redundancy. Another example is [11], which
proposed a one-dimensional CNN tasked for supervised learning on time-series
NID data. Moreover, more works have applied CNNs to a hierarchical framework
that considers other types of features not related to spatial locality in the dataset.
This is seen in [12], for example, where a CNN architecture is combined with a
bi-directional long short-term memory (LSTM) model that extracts time-based
features. Even though most supervised learning models include methods to ac-
count for class imbalance in the datasets, this paper neither focuses on supervised
learning nor the problem of imbalanced distribution.
On the other hand, more intrusion detection algorithms include unsuper-
vised learning techniques, where the input data does not need a label. These tech-
niques generally incorporate clustering, which allows analysis of patterns within
data by the partition of the dataset. The ultimate goal of clustering algorithms
is to maximize intraclass similarity and minimize interclass similarity. K-means is
a well-known clustering algorithm that partitions data based on the selection of k
cluster centroids. [13] was the one of the earliest papers to propose an intrusion
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detection algorithm based on K-means. Even though the algorithm is suitable for
large datasets, the algorithm is not as robust as other clustering algorithms due to
its requirement of a pre-defined k value before running the algorithm. [14] intro-
duced density-based spatial clustering of applications with noise (DBSCAN), which
offered more robustness compared to K-means by requiring one input parameter
and supporting the user in determining an appropriate value for that parameter.
Semi-supervised learning requires that a certain proportion of data points
contains labels while the rest are unlabeled [15], which can be useful as labelling
data from a large dataset becomes a daunting task for human annotators. Some
models that utilize this type of learning train on the labelled data in order to assign
a label to a previously unlabeled point. For example, [16] applied the above task
to images outputted by a GAN generator using feature matching, where images
are generated based on the statistics of real data. These newly generated images
are added to the training set.
In the case of network intrusion detection, works that utilize semi-supervised
learning follow the procedure of performing an unsupervised feature extraction and
supervised classification, which is usually done using an autoencoder-based archi-
tecture. For example, [17] proposed an approach based on a stacked autoencoder,
where encoding layers from each autoencoder in a set of n autoencoders are at-
tached for feature extraction after the layers pretrained to minimize reconstruction
error.
However, little work has been done to consider a semi-supervised approach
for anomaly-based network intrusion detection, where the model is trained on
labeled normal data in order to minimize reconstruction error before including
both normal and attack data during the testing process. Network traffic attacks
are identified if they produce an anomalous reconstruction error. [4] tested au-
toencoder and variational autoencoder models against a support vector machine
to assess performance on the CIC-IDS2017 dataset, showing that the variational
autoencoder performed best out of the three models.
5
3 Background
It is important to have an understanding of preliminary concepts within machine
learning before delving into the proposed model. This chapter explores the ideas of
artificial neural network, autoencoder, variational autoencoder, and convolutions
when used in machine learning technologies.
3.1 Artificial Neural Network
Let x = (x1 x2 . . . xn)
T be a column vector. We define an artificial neural
network as a mathematical model of interconnected nodes that includes a set of
input nodes that process x and a set of output nodes such that one output node
is emphasized given x. The nodes are arranged in layers, where the output of one
layer may serve as input to another [18]. To simulate synaptic connection and
the transference of information in the brain, a node ci in one layer of size m is
connected to all or a subset of nodes dj in the next layer of size n using a weighted
value wmn. (Let’s assume for the sake of this explanation that each node di is





where f is called the activation function, which simulates the level of activity of
dj, and b is the bias term, which allows dj to have a required output value in case
it is not possible. Some activation functions such as the sigmoid and hyperbolic
tangent functions are commonly utilized to assign a value between a certain range,
where the higher value denotes an active node while the lower value denotes an
inactive node.
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Our proposed model uses a feedforward neural network, where the connec-
tions between nodes do not form a cycle. In other words, input to the neural
network is generally processed from one layer to another such that the information
does not revert back to a layer in order to obtain an output for the input. This
output is compared with the actual output for the data point x(i), where the calcu-
lated difference is called the loss. Various loss functions such as the mean-squared
error and binary cross-entropy are commonly used.
During the training process, the network learns through a process called
backpropagation, where loss is fed back through the network, resulting in updates
of weights in the network. Different gradient-based techniques such as Adam [19]
and stochastic gradient descent have been used to update these weights such that
the loss converges as the training process progresses.
3.2 Autoencoder
With regards to the proposed model, we first define an autoencoder as an acyclic
feed-forward unsupervised neural network that learns how to reconstruct a given
input with minimal loss. An autoencoder generally consists of four components:
the encoder layer, the decoder layer, the bottleneck, and the reconstruction loss
function.
Let x be any input to an autoencoder. The encoder layer f yield the
bottleneck z by computing z = f(x), where z is of lower dimension than x. In
other words, the bottleneck z is a compressed representation of the original input x.
From there z serves as input for the decoder layer g, producing the reconstruction x′
after computing x′ = g(z). To train the autoencoder, we examine the minimization
of the reconstruction loss L(x, x′) = L(x, (g ◦ f)(x)), which helps us assess the
performance of the decoder by measuring how close the reconstructed input is to
the original input.
We note that although a traditional autoencoder consists of a single layer
for both the encoder and the decoder, multiple layers can be applied to the encoder
7
Figure 3.1: Deep Autoencoder
and the decoder, producing an architecture that has autoencoders within autoen-
coders. We call this particular type of autoencoder a stacked (or deep) autoen-
coder, which is shown in Figure 3.1. Stacked autoencoders have been frequently
used for dimensionality reduction [20]. As they consist of multiple traditional au-
toencoders, the training process for a stacked autoencoder can be ”layer-wise” for
each autoencoder: The process typically starts with the pre-training of each in-
dividual autoencoder before attaching encoders and decoders together such that
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, the output of ith encoder layer acts as input for the (i + 1)th
encoder layer while the output of the (i+ 1)th decoder layer acts an input for the
ith decoder layer.
With a semi-supervised learning paradigm, where the training process in-
volves unlabelled normal data points, the reconstruction loss makes an autoencoder
a popular model for detecting anomalies. As a result of L(x, x′) being minimized
after training, this implies that L(x, x′) is relatively low among normal data points.
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Hence, when the trained autoencoder is given an anomalous data point, we expect
L(x, x′) to have a significantly large value. This allows us to enact a threshold θ
on a value for L(x, x′) of any tested data point x to detect whether x is a normal
point or an anomaly using the following output y:
y =
normal, L(x, x′) < θanomaly, L(x, x′) ≥ θ
We do note that there are different ways of determining the threshold θ for
an anomaly detection task. One method is to determine θ beforehand and utilize
trial and error to optimize θ, which may prove to be tedious. Alternatively, θ can
be expressed as a function of the losses of each data point x(i), where the function
could be the mean, median, or percentile of the losses [21].
3.3 Variational Autoencoder
Our proposed approach consists of a special type of autoencoder, the vari-
ational autoencoder, that involves variational Bayesian inference [22], where
the latent variable z is sampled from an approximate posterior inference qφ(z|x)
given a set of input X. Let φ be the parameters associated with the encoding layer
and θ be the parameters associated with the decoding layer. Compared to the
traditional autoencoder, the encoding layer of a variational autoencoder calculates
the approximate posterior inference qφ(z|x), where the approximate posterior in-
ference is needed over the true posterior inference pφ(z|x(i)) as the true posterior
is intractable due to the high-dimensional nature of X. Moreover, the decoding
layer calculates the approximate marginal inference p(x|z).
Letting X= {x(1), x(2), . . . , x(n)} be input data points from a dataset, the
objective function for a variational autoencoder is defined as the variational lower
bound of the marginal likelihood of the whole dataset, where the marginal likeli-
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hood of the set on parameters θ is computed as
log pθ(x





The marginal likelihood of each data point x(i) is expressed as
log pθ(x
(i)) = DKL(qφ(z|x(i))||pφ(z|x(i)) + L(θ, φ;x(i)) (3.2)
The first term on the right side of Equation 3.2 is the Kullback-Leibler divergence,
which measures the dissimilarity between the approximate posterior and the actual
posterior. Meanwhile, the other term on the right side of equation (3.2) is the
variational lower bound of the marginal likelihood of x(i), which can be written as
the following equation:
L(θ, φ;x(i)) = −DKL(qφ(z|x(i))||pφ(z|x(i)) + Eqφ(z|x(i))[log pθ(x
(i)|z)] (3.3)
In order to perform backpropagation to train the variational autoencoder,
we need to compute the gradient of L(θ, φ;x(i)) with respect to the parameters θ
and φ. While the KL-divergence term is differentiable [22], when considering the
second term of L(θ, φ;x(i)), however, the computation is a very difficult task for
a number of reasons, including the inability to evaluate the second term, which
is an expectation function, in closed form [23]. Hence it is necessary to find an
estimator of the gradient of Eqφ(z|x(i))[log pθ(x
(i)|z)] that is differentiable.
The inclusion of a stochastic gradient estimator may also alter the way the
latent variable z is sampled from the approximate posterior qφ(z|x(i)). This is
where z ∼ qφ(z|x(i)) is reparametrized to a function gφ(ε, x) that is differentiable,
where ε ∼ p(ε).
This results in the following estimator L̃(θ, φ;x(i)):
L̃(θ, φ;x(i)) = −DKL(qφ(z|x(i))||pφ(z|x(i))) + log pθ(x(i)|z), (3.4)
where z = gφ(ε, x
(i)) and ε ∼ p(ε). This equation can be interpreted as the overall
reconstruction loss function, where the KL-divergence term regularizes the encod-
ing parameters φ in order to ensure that qφ(z|x(i)) is close to the prior pφ(z) and
the second term is the expected reconstruction error.
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3.4 Convolutional Layers in Machine Learning
The CNN architecture is usually implemented in order to capture spatial patterns
within data. Unlike regular ANNs, the primary operation that is computed in
a layer of a CNN is convolution , denoted as the symbol ∗. In general, the
convolution of any two functions a(t) and b(t) gives the following result h(t):
h(t) = (a ∗ b)(t) =
∫
a(s)b(t− s)ds (3.5)
In the case of the CNN architecture, the convolution between the input matrix and
a kernel matrix produces an output matrix that is often called a feature map. Even
though both the input and kernel matrices are of n-dimension for some positive
integer n, the size of the kernel is smaller than the size of the input in order to
preserve the spatial relationship between input units. This is what we refer to as
the sparse connectivity of layers as opposed to the full connectivity between layers
as seen in artificial neural networks.
As mentioned earlier, the CNN architecture is frequently used on image
data, which would require the input matrices to be two-dimensional (or three-
dimensional if the image has colors other than those of greyscale). However, the
two-dimensional input does not have to involve image data. In the previous chap-
ter, a few key works that utilized methods of converting one-dimensional vectors
to two-dimensional image formats were highlighted.
In the case of the input matrix I ∈ Ra×b and the kernel matrix K ∈ Rm×n,
where a > m and b > n, we have the following for the convolution of I and K on
some location Si,j in the resulting convolution S:






This value can also be activated using an activation function to produce a feature
map that is in Rs×t. We note that multiple kernels, hence multiple feature maps,
can be considered for a convolution layer in order to extract different pieces of
information from an input. For instance, feature maps for an image can contain
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information about edges or various shapes [24]. Having multiple feature maps
allows the network to better learn on input.
The resulting set of feature maps may be modified using an operation called
pooling , which provides a summary statistic of a small number of regions in the
outputted set. There are a number of statistics that can be reported such as the
max value, the L2 norm of the region, or even a weighted average based on the
distance from the central pixel in the region. When it comes to network traffic
data, even though we do not need to worry about the translation invariance that
pooling ensures, we do take advantage of the improved computational efficiency of
pooling as it reduces the number of parameters for a training model.
We also note that especially for generative models. reverse operations for
convolution, which is called transpose convolution and pooling, which is called
unpooling, exist. The transpose convolution operation on a layer with m feature
maps undoes the convolution operation by expanding each of the m feature maps
to be the input of the convolution operation, resulting in a matrix Ra×b.
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4 Methodology
This chapter discusses the proposed method for anomaly-based network
intrusion detection. This method utilizes a semi-supervised learning algorithm
through the use of a variational autoencoder, Anomaly-CNVAE, that is properly
trained on the spatial and temporal features that are represented in benchmark
network intrusion datasets. As they contain stochastic latent representations due
to their probabilistic nature, variational autoencoders better discern the difference
between normal and anomalous data points by accounting for the variability be-
tween data points rather than solely the average that autoencoders account for.
As a result, anomaly detection using variational autoencoders can produce a lower
false alarm rate than detection using autoencoders.
In order to learn on the spatial and temporal features of network traffic
data, we incorporate the use of one-dimensional convolutional layers as opposed
to two-dimensional convolutional layers. Even though it is a popular choice for
CNNs, the option of using two-dimensional convolutional layers comes down to
optimizing the size of the input, which may result in loss of information especially
if the number of features for each data point in the set cannot be evenly converted
to an n-by-n format.
The following sections provide a detailed description of each component
of the proposed method of identifying anomalies in network traffic data: data
preprocessing, architecture, and the anomaly detection method.
4.1 Data Preprocessing
Let X = {x(1), . . . , x(n)} be the set of input network traffic data such that
each data point x(i) is m-dimensional, with m as the number of features. We first
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eliminate any data points in X that have missing values.
Our semi-supervised learning algorithm requires data to be numerical. This
is problematic for benchmark datasets dealing with network activity, some of which
having a few features containing categorical data, which is non-numerical. There-
fore, in order for these features to be processed through our model, we perform one-
hot encoding for each categorical feature in X if X contains any non-numerical
features. The encoding process generates new columns for X with each new col-
umn titled a category represented in categorical data. Each new column consists
of binary labels 0 and 1 where 0 denotes that a data point x(i) does not take on
that category and 1 denotes that x(i) takes on that category.
The last step of data preprocessing is the normalization of X in order to
improve the performance of Anomaly-CNVAE. We chose to scale features to have
values between 0 and 1 by computing the normalized value x′(ij) for 1 ≤ j ≤ m
with the following equation:
x′(ij) =
x(ij) −min(x(i1), . . . , x(im))
max(x(i1), . . . , x(im))−min(x(i1), . . . , x(im))
(4.1)
4.2 Architecture
After the input data is preprocessed, the architecture takes each normalized x′(i)
as input. The architecture of Anomaly-CNVAE, which is diagrammed in Fig-
ure 4.1, consists of four components: the encoding convolutional layers, a latent
representation, the decoding transpose-convolutional layers, and a loss function
associated with the model.
First, each x′(i) is encoded through 1 one-dimensional convolution layer that
is followed by a pooling layer. With each kernel having size 7, the convolution layer
is going to consist of 40 feature maps, which are of size p, where
p = (number of features)− 6.
Each feature map yj produced using the following equation, with a as input for
the feature map, σ denoting an activation function, K denoting a kernel matrix,
14
Figure 4.1: The architecture of Anomaly-CNVAE using input with 122 features
and b as bias:
yj = σ(Ka+ b)
The feature maps then go through maximum pooling of kernel size 4 and stride 4,
reducing the dimensionality of the feature maps by half. After the sequence of one
convolutional layer and one max pooling layer, the feature maps are then flattened
into a single layer of size q, where
q = (p/4)− 3.
The flattened layer is then split into the mean and variance vectors. The
latent representation z, which has the same dimension as the mean and variance
vectors, is obtained using the reparametrization trick discussed earlier in chapter
3. Assuming that the approximate posterior q(z|x(i)) is a multivariate Gaussian
distribution N (µ(i), σ2(i)), we have a reparametrization
z = gφ(ε, x
(i)) = µ(i) + σ2(i)  ε, (4.2)
where ε ∼ N (0, I).
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The latent representation z, which is initially transformed to have 40 fea-
ture maps, is then decompressed through a sequence of max unpooling and one-
dimensional transpose convolution. The decompression starts by performing max
unpooling on z using a kernel size of 4 and a stride of 4 in order to revert the max
pooling operation that was done x′(i) in the encoding layer. After that, the data
is taken through a one-dimensional transpose convolutional layer using kernel size
7 to undo the one-dimensional convolution operation performed in the encoding
layer. This will result in an output that has one feature map. Finally, in order
to account for the loss function, we attach a fully-connected layer of input size,
producing a reconstruction of the input x′(i).
The following equation is the loss function used to train and perform anomaly
detection using the Anomaly-CNVAE model:




(1 + log((σ(i))2)− (µ(i))2 − (σ(i))2) + log pθ(x(i)|z(i)). (4.3)
4.3 Anomaly Detection
Our proposed model Anomaly-CNVAE is designed to perform anomaly de-
tection on network traffic data. Rather than using a pre-specified threshold, we
demonstrate the robustness of the detection mechanism by considering a thresh-
old function t as the 95th percentile of the distribution of losses Ltrain obtained
from the last epoch of the training process. The last epoch is the theoretical
point where the average loss of data converges, i.e. the point where the loss re-
mains almost stagnant from epoch to epoch. In addition, the threshold function t
produces a threshold relative to the dataset rather than merely choosing a value
for the threshold, which could be a bit cumbersome when working with multiple
benchmark datasets.
As shown in Equation 4.4, we determine whether a data point x(i) is normal








Dataset No. of Features Normal Abnormal (Attack)
NSL-KDD 122 77,054 10,719
UNSW-NB15 198 93,000 13,950
TRAbID 43 43,676 6,551
Table 5.1: Data Used for Experiments
Table 5.1 shows statistics that are considered for the experimentation of
Anomaly-CNVAE for each dataset, with the number of features being computed
after one-hot encoding during the data preprocessing stage. In this section, we
discuss three benchmark datasets chosen for preprocessing and the testing of each
model for network intrusion detection.
5.1.1 NSL-KDD
The NSL-KDD dataset, proposed by [25], was collected at the Canadian Institute
for Cybersecurity as an improvement on another benchmark dataset: the KDD-
CUP99 set. Even though it’s been widely utilized, KDDCUP99 has its fair share
of issues, namely redundancy in records in the set, which would cause biases to-
ward the records, and a low difficulty of prediction for the set. NSL-KDD not only
removes redundant records from KDDCUP99 but also increases the difficulty for
classifiers when they learn on the set.
Features of the NSL-KDD dataset, which remained unchanged from the
KDDCUP99 dataset, are divided into three groups: basic features, where values
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are extracted from the TCP/IP connection, traffic features, which contain time-
based values that are calculated in relation to a window of 2 seconds (or 100
connections to account for attacks that do not produce intrusion patterns within
the two-second window), and content features, which examine the data portion of
packets to account for attacks such as R2L and U2R that do not have time-based
intrusion patterns.
Attacks represented in the dataset fall into one of four categories: Denial of
Service (DoS), where attackers may force computing resources to be unavailable to
legitimate users, User to Root Attack (U2R), where attackers initially have access
to a system as normal users en route to root access to the system, Remote to Local
Attack (R2L), where the attacker has the ability to send packets to a machine over
a network without having an account, and probing, where the attacker seeks to
gather information about a network in order to gain access through a weak point
in the network.
5.1.2 UNSW-NB15
The UNSW-NB15 dataset was created by researchers at the Cyber Range Lab
of the Australian Centre for Cyber Security to include more modern examples
than other records in sets such as KDDCUP99 and NSL-KDD. The set contains
a mixture of real normal activities and synthetic attack abnormal network traffic,
where nine families of attacks are represented [26]. However, in order to address
the lack of low footprint attacks, where the attacks don’t install new software to a
computer, most of these attacks differ from attacks represented in the NSL-KDD
dataset. Besides DoS, the UNSW-NB15 dataset includes groups of low footprint
attacks such as generic, where the attacker targets block ciphers, fuzzers, where
the attacker attempts to suspend a computer program or network by giving it
randomly generated data, and exploits, where the attacker has enough knowledge
of a pitfall in the network’s security to exploit its vulnerability.
Using two tools that process raw packet files, Argus and Bro-IDS, the first
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35 features of the UNSW-NB15 dataset are obtained by matching the generated
features that come from the output files in an SQL Server database. These features
include packet-based features, where values come from examining the payload of
a network packet, and flow-based features, where values come from examining
packets that are under network connections. The last 12 features of the UNSW-
NB15 dataset are considered general purpose and connection features.
5.1.3 TRAbID
The TRAbID dataset [27] is named after the paper ”Towards a Reliable
Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection in real-world environments”, from which the
set was proposed. In order to address the lack of datasets that represent real-
world network traffic, sixteen intrusion databases were created with network data
points generated from activity of two automated users to a honeypot server: normal
client and attacker. For the background traffic, each client, which executes random
behavior not reliant on a statistical distribution, requests services such as HTTP,
SMTP, and SSH that are common in network behavior. The traffic is determined
to be valid if the client sends a real and valid request to the server and receives a
real and valid reply from the server. On the other hand, the automated attacker
can generate one of two types of attacks, probing and DoS, resulting in different
groups of attack similarity such as network-level vulnerabilities and service-level
vulnerabilities that are represented in the databases.
To extract features, a set of 50 predetermined features that was determined
and experimented by the same group in an earlier study was considered for each
network packet. (In the dataset, 43 features are represented.) Each feature fits into
one of three categories: header-based, where values are based on the network packet
header, host-based, which examines the communication history between hosts, and
service-based, which examines the communication history between services.
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5.2 Experiments
The training algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. The performance of Anomaly-
CNVAE on network intrusion detection was evaluated against two other semi-
supervised models: a vanilla deep autoencoder, where all layers are fully connected,
and a variational autoencoder, which were both implemented by [4]. The exper-
iments were implemented using Python 3.7 along with built-in libraries such as
Sci-kit Learn and Pytorch, both of which are commonly used to program machine
learning models. In particular, the Pytorch library contains built-in implemen-
tation for various layers such as convolution, transpose convolution, max pooling,
and linear that were used to construct the model. The experiments were conducted
on a Dell Precision 7920 with an Intel Xeon Gold 5220 CPU and a NVIDIA Quatro
RTX 8000.
In general, the training process was conducted on a train/test split for each
dataset, where 75% of data points, all normal, were used for training while the
other 25%, which contains both normal and anomalous data points, were used to
evaluate anomaly detection.
The following sections highlight specific hyperparameters used to test each
21
model, and two evaluation metrics to analyze the results of the experiment.
5.2.1 Hyperparameters For Each Model
The three models shared a number of hyperparameters, including ones for the
Stochastic Gradient Descent optimizer algorithm such as learning rate, which was
set to 0.001, the momentum, which was set to 0.3, and the L2 penalty, which was
set to 0.001. Moreover, a batch size of 256 and an epoch size of 30 were used to
train each model on each of the three datasets. These values were chosen after
tuning on the hyperparameters.
It is also important to note the following activation functions and layers
used for each model. For the vanilla deep autoencoder, three hidden layers of size
512, 256, and 64 were used with the latent representation having size 64. For all






was chosen as the activation function. The softmax function σ(x)i, defined for all






was chosen as the activation function for the final decoding layer, which produces
a reconstruction of the input.
The sizes of the encoding and decoding layers for the vanilla variational
autoencoder were the same as the vanilla autoencoder. However, instead of the
sigmoid function, the Leaky ReLU function f(x), defined as
f(x) =
x, x > 00.01x x ≤ 0 (5.3)
was replaced as the activation for almost all the layers except the final decoding
layer, which still used the softmax function as its activation function, in order to
resolve the vanishing gradient problem that the sigmoid function runs into [28].
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For Anomaly CN-VAE, the sizes of the one-dimensional convolution, pool-
ing, max unpooling, and one-dimensional transpose convolution layers were stated
earlier in chapter 4. Both the convolution and transpose convolution layers used
the Leaky ReLU function as their activation functions.
5.2.2 Evaluation Metrics
The performance of the three models were evaluated on each test set of the bench-
mark datasets using two metrics. One metric is accuracy, which is simply the
percentage of data points that the model correctly detects as either normal or
anomalous. However, it is not enough to have accuracy as the sole metric for
this experiment as there is a larger proportion of normal data points compared to
anomalous data points across all datasets.
Hence, in addition to accuracy, our experiments use the F1 score to de-
termine how well the models detect the network traffic data points. The metric,
defined in equation (6.4), is the harmonic mean of the following two metrics: pre-
cision P , which is the proportion of true normal results to the number of data
points classified as normal, and recall R, which is the proportion of true normal
results to the number of data points labelled normal.




Model NSL-KDD UNSW-NB15 TRAbID
Vanilla AE [4] 69.28 58.61 62.44
Vanilla VAE [4] 72.63 70.60 64.19
Anomaly-CNVAE 83.60 79.49 70.35
Table 5.2: Accuracy for each model by dataset
23
Model NSL-KDD UNSW-NB15 TRAbID
Vanilla AE [4] 66.94 53.52 41.11
Vanilla VAE [4] 70.71 70.67 47.19
Anomaly-CNVAE 81.02 78.49 57.22
Table 5.3: F1 score for each model by dataset
Tables 7.1 and 7.2 indicate the accuracy and F1 score, respectively, of each
model on the four benchmark datasets. For the first three datasets, the Anomaly-
CNVAE model was significantly more accurate in its detection of network traffic
anomalies. Moreover, there was an apparent increase in F1 score for the Anomaly-
CNVAE model, indicating that model’s accuracy does not favor the set of normal
data points, which is substantially larger than the set of anomalous data points.
Moreover, the difference between accuracy and F1 score either stayed con-
sistent or even better for Anomaly-CNVAE than the other two models. This is
especially apparent for experiments on the three models for the TRAbID dataset,
where the dropoff was greatest. Despite the significant dropoff, we also see that the
reduction of the dropoff was greatest for Anomaly-CNVAE on top of its improved
accuracy and F1 score.
Even though we see increases in accuracy and F1 score for Anomaly-CNVAE,
the results also indicate that more work needs to be done to further improve the
model’s performance. We do note that the performance of the models need to be
evaluated on a few more benchmark network traffic datasets in order to confirm not
only that the Anomaly-CNVAE outperforms the autoencoder and the variational
autoencoder models but also that its accuracy and F1 score allow the model to be
integrated into future network intrusion detection systems. As seen in the results
for the TRAbID dataset, a 57.22 F1-score for the Anomaly-CNVAE is an indicator




In this paper we introduced a new variational autoencoder model that
performed anomaly-based detection on network intrusion using semi-supervised
learning. In order to learn on features in network traffic datasets, which are both
content-based (spatial) and time-based (temporal), we infused one-dimensional
convolutional and transpose convolutional layers into the model. After training
the model on normal traffic data points to reduce reconstruction loss, we incorpo-
rated the model into an overall detection scheme that determined whether a traffic
record was normal or anomalous based on a threshold computed using a percentile
of losses obtained from the training of the model. With an increase in accuracy
and F1 score, experiments on four benchmark datasets show that model signifi-
cantly outperformed other semi-supervised learning models in detecting network
intrusions.
Even though the model showed improvement compared to previous semi-
supervised learning models that perform anomaly-based network intrusion detec-
tion, it is also clear from the results that extensive work still needs to be carried
out to create a model best fit for the task. For future work, we may explore the
performance of learning for preprocessing techniques other than one-hot encoding
in order to generate and test different sets of features.
There may be some possible applications of a model similar to Anomaly-
CNVAE to network intrusion. For example, the model could be part of a pipeline
that not only identifies anomaly-based intrusions but also classifies attacks based on
the model’s detection. To go even further, since unknown attacks commonly occur
in network traffic analysis, especially zero-day attacks where new vulnerabilities
pertaining to a computer network are exploited [29], the results from the model
can help identify new attacks in real time.
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